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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK V. COLOMBO, JR., a minor, 
by VIRGINIA VON STORCH, as 
Guardian of his Person and Estate, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ( Case No 
vs. ( 12292 
WALKER BANK AND TRUST COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by plaintiff to seek reversal 
of the rejection of a creditor's claim against the Estate of 
Frank V. Colombo, Sr., by respondent Walker Bank and 
Trust Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court entered a Decree of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks a determination by this Court that the 
Decree of the lower Court was erroneous and should be re-
versed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On the 15th day of February 1969, Frank V. 
Colombo died intestate at Freeport, Grand Bahamas, Ba-
hamas (Judgment Roll, page 1). 
2. On March 4, 1969, the District Court in and for 
Carbon County, duly entered its Order appointing Walker 
Bank and Trust Company Administrator of the Estate of 
Frank V. Colombo, Deceased, and Letters of Administration 
were duly issued to Walker Bank and Trust Company on 
that date (Judgment Roll, page 1). 
3. By Order of said Court, on March 26, 1969, the 
plaintiff herein was duly appointed as Guardian of the Per-
son and of the Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr., a minor 
child of Frank V. Colombo, Deceased, and the plaintiff here-
in. Letters of Guardianship were duly issued and the plain-
tiff herein has since that date and now is the Guardian of 
the Person and the Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr. (Judg-
ment Roll, page 1). 
4. On the 15th day of November, 1966, by virtue of 
a Decree of Divorce, Civil No. 9231, entered in the District 
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, plaintiff was 
awarded Judgment against defendant Frank V. Colombo, 
Deceased, for the support and maintenance of the minor 
child of the parties, Frank V. Colombo, Jr., in the sum of 
$150.00 per month to commence with the month of Novem-
ber 1966 and to continue until further Order of the Court 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, paragraph 3). 
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5. Under the terms of the Decree, Frank V. Colombo, 
Deceased, paid plaintiff support money for Frank V. 
Colombo, Jr., his son, up to and including the month of his 
death, February 1969 (TR-20). 
6. On the 12th day of May 1969, plaintiff duly pre-
sented to defendant a claim of $15,150.00, but defendant 
refused to allow the same, and on the 10th day of July 1969, 
rejected the claim (Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT AN OBLIGATION OF CHILD SUP-
PORT PROVIDED FOR IN A DECREE OF DI-
VORCE GRANTING CHILD SUPPORT UNTIL 
"FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT" SUR-
VIVES AS A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE 
OF DR. FRANK V. COLOMBO, DECEASED. 
It is well settled by a long line of decisions throughout 
the United States that the liability of a father is not ter-
minated by his death and that a Divorce Court has the 
power to make child support a continuing obligation which 
shall survive against his estate as to subsequently accruing 
installments. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce & Separation §856, 
page 972; 27B C. J. S. Divorce §323 (f), page 729; Newman 
V. Burwell, 15 P. 2d 511 (Calif. 1932); Taylor v. George, 
212 P. 2d 505 (Calif., 1949). 
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A provision in the Decree of Divorce against a father 
for the payment of a certain sum monthly "until further 
Order of the Court" creates a non-dischargeable obligation 
against the estate of the deceased father. 24 Am. Jur. 2d 
Divorce & Separation §856, page 972, 18 A. L. R. 2d, pages 
1133-1135. 
In Utah, the leading and most recent case directly in 
point is Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, 1011 
(Utah, 1898), in which the court stated: 
"Whether or not the divorced wife and minor child-
ren, or any of them, are entitled to have the pay-
ment of alimony or money for their support con-
tinue after the death of the deceased, depends on 
the nature and terms of the Decree allowing the 
same. 
The children during their minority had no other 
recourse against their father or his estate for sup-
port than that provided in the Decree unless by 
the Order of the Court." 
At page 1012, the Court quoted the applicable statute. Sec-
tion 2606, Comp. Laws Utah, 1888: 
"Provided, further, that when it shall appear to the 
Court at a future time, that it would be for the in-
terest of the parties concerned that a change should 
be effected in regard to the former disposal of child-
ren or distribution of property, the Court shall have 
power to make such change as will be conducive to 
the best interests of all parties concerned." 
This statute bears close similarity to the currently applic-
able Utah statute, Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953: 
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"Such subsequent changes or new orders may be 
made by the Court with respect to the disposal of 
the children or the distribution of property as shall 
be reasonable and proper." 
In discussing Section 2606, the Court stated at page 
1012: 
"The Court may make such order respecting the 
property and the support and maintenance of the 
wife and children, as is just and equitable, and such 
Order or Decree may be made to continue in force 
after his decease; and the Court may afterwards, if 
occasion shall require it, make such change in any 
Decree as 'will be conductive to the best interest of 
all parties concerned.' " 
The Court concluded by stating : 
"We cannot sanction appellants' contention. It is 
unsound as being at variance not only with the De-
crees of the Court and the law, but also with justice; 
for it is the solemn duty of every husband and 
father to support his wife during life, and his child-
ren during their minority, suitably to their station 
in life, and if he fails to do so, every principle of 
justice demands that they be thus supported out of 
his estate." 
The doctrine of Murphy v. Moyle, that a claim against 
a deceased parent's estate for continuing child support can 
be maintained, has been cited in many decisions in other 
states. 
In a leading California case, Newman V. Burwell, 15 P. 
2d 511 (Calif., 1932), the court stated at page 512: 
"Decedent's obligation to pay this particular sum 
during his lifetime arose out of . . . the Decree of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Divorce . . . Upon the death of decedent this portion 
of plaintiff's claim when duly presented or filed 
became a charge upon the estate payable out of the 
assets thereof." 
The Court went on to stats at 512 that : 
'They, (Murphy case and others) . . . indubitably 
establish that a father's obligation to support his 
minor child . . . survives his death . . . and that an 
action . . . may be brought to establish the same as 
a valid claim . . . against the father's estate. It is 
true that in certain of the cited cases, the father's 
obligation was to pay the designated sum monthly 
during the minority of the child, thus tending to 
irrefutably indicate that it was to survive the father, 
whereas the obligation here imposed was to continue 
'until further order of the Court'. However these 
same authorities recognize that in the absence of an 
expressed intention to limit such obligation to the 
lifetime of the father, the same will, and does, sur-
vive his death, even under a Decree imposing the 
same until 'further order of the Court.' " 
The California courts again interpreted similar provisions 
in In Re Goulart's Estate, 32 Cal. Rpt. 229, 231 (D. C. 1st 
Dist., Calif., 1963), wherein the court in quoting from Tay-
lor V. George, 212 P. 2d 505 (Calif., 1949), said: 
"In California the rule is that the obligation of a 
father to support his minor child which is fixed by 
Divorce Decree . . . does not cease upon the father's 
death, but survives as a charge against his estate." 
In Hill V. Matthews, 416 P. 2d 144 (N. M., 1966), the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico was faced with this question 
for the first time and in referring to Murphy v. Moyle and 
other decisions, they concluded at page 146: 
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"We conclude that where a father has been ordered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction to make child 
support payments until his child reaches majority, 
in accord with a stipulation such as was present in 
this case, and thereafter the father dies while the 
child is yet a minor, that a claim may be successfully 
prosecuted in the probate court against the estate 
of the father to enforce the payment." 
In Edelman v. Edelman, 199 P. 2d 840 (Wyo., 1948), 
the court noted at page 843, that the Decree of Divorce stip-
ulated that the defendant: 
"Should contribute the sum of $30.00 per month for 
the maintenance and support of said minor child 
until further order of this court." (Emphasis ours.) 
The same language, "until further Order of the Court" was 
used in the instant Decree of Divorce (Defendant's Exhibit 
After an extensive review of the cases in point, includ-
ing the Moyle decision, the Wyoming court determined at 
page 848 that: 
"The same will, and does, survive his death, even 
under a Decree imposing the same 'until further 
order of the Court/ " 
In Bailey v. Bailey, 471 P. 2d 220 (Nev., 1970), the 
Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the same problem 
and took cognizance of the Moyle decision in arriving at 
its conclusion. At page 222, the court stated: 
"Other courts have permitted child support decrees 
to be enforced against a decedent's estate without 
his consent. In Murphy v. Moyle . . . a decision to 
that effect was grounded in a divorce statute giving 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the court power to make such provision for the 
children 'as may be just and equitable' ". 
The court also looked at Newman v. Burwell, infra, 
and stated: 
"We decline, however to follow the lead of Cali-
fornia and Utah and hold that an order granting 
child support until further order of the Court or 
during minority is such an exercise of discretion." 
The Nevada court recognized that Murphy v. Moyle, infra, 
is still the law in Utah, but based its decision on the theory 
that if a judicial decree is to be held to impose upon the 
father a greater duty of child support than that required 
by common law, the decree must specifically state that such 
obligation is to survive the death of the obligor. 
The most recent interpretation of the Moyle decision 
in Utah is found in Callister v. Callister, 261 P. 2d 944, 947 
(Utah, 1953), where the Court held: 
"It is true that in that case (Moyle) the claim made 
against the deceased husband's estate was for sup-
port of a minor child, but the opinion expressed as 
to the power of the court under the statute to award 
alimony to continue after the death of the husband 
appears to be supported by the weight of judicial 
authority." 
Although this case dealt with alimony as opposed to child 
support, it reiterated the basic proposition of Moyle that 
an obligation based upon a Decree of Divorce whether for 
alimony or for child support, survives as a claim against 
the deceased's estate. 
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE MATER-
IALLY CHANGED IN FAVOR OF FRANK V. 
COLOMBO, JR., SINCE THE DECREE OF DI-
VORCE. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record as to the 
extent and amount of any social security support payments 
currently being made to Virginia Von Storch as Guardian 
of the Person and Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr. 
In addition, there is absolutely no evidence in the rec-
ord as to whether Frank V. Colombo, Jr., received the Col-
umbine Coal Company stock referred to in the Judgment 
Roll, page 42. Mr. LeFevre stated that he did not have any 
record that showed that Dr. Colombo ever distributed the 
stock to Frank V. Colombo, Jr. (TR-17). 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY 
WITH FRANK V. COLOMBO, JR. AS BENE-
FICIARY WAS SUFFICIENT REASON TO 
TERMINATE DR. FRANK V. COLOMBO'S 
DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS SON AFTER DEATH. 
The Decree of Divorce stipulated in paragraph 4: 
"Defendant is now carrying a life insurance policy 
on his own life in the face amount of $20,000.00 
with Frankie Colombo as beneficiary thereunder. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant shall continue to keep said policy in 
force with said Frankie Colombo as the bene-
ficiary until such time as said child has completed 
his college or other educational training." 
Dr. Colombo, prior to the divorce, was maintaining the 
policy on his life for his son's benefit and the Divorce De-
cree merely stipulated that he must continue to do so. The 
Decree further set forth a specific time limit for the main-
tenance of this policy, i.e., through the completion of his 
college or other eduactional training. It seems clear that 
the purpose of the life insurance policy was to insure that 
Frankie V. Colombo, Jr. would have sufficient funds to 
complete his advanced education should his father die be-
fore it was completed. The District Court's reasoning be-
comes even more apparent when considering the fact that 
Dr. Colombo's other children had completed their college 
educations (TR-22). 
Finally, there is nothing in the Decree which would 
indicate that this policy would be in lieu of monthly support 
payments, but rather it appears to be in addition to monthly 
support payments. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the evidence in the record, as well as 
the foregoing cases and authorities, support the position 
that Frank V. Colombo has a valid claim against the 
estate of his deceased father, Frank V. Colombo, and 
that he must receive, in the alternative (1) the sum of 
$150.00 per month from February 1969 to June 1977 when 
Frank V. Colombo, Jr. reaches his majority, or (2) the sum 
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of $11,872.04, the present value of $15,150.00 invested at 
the legal rate of six percent (6%) over the period of one 
hundred and one (101) months (Judgment Roll, pages 12-
Respectfully submitted, 
James B. Lee 
Edward J. McCarthy 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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